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Extremism without extremists:
Deffuant model with emotions
Pawel Sobkowicz*
National Centre for Nuclear Research, Warsaw, Poland
The frequent occurrence of extremist views in many social contexts, often growing from
small minorities to almost total majority, poses a significant challenge for democratic
societies. The phenomenon can be described within the sociophysical paradigm. We
present a modified version of the continuous bounded confidence opinion model,
including a simple description of the influence of emotions on tolerances, and eventually
on the evolution of opinions. Allowing for psychologically based correlation between the
extreme opinions, high emotions and low tolerance for other people’s views leads to quick
dominance of the extreme views within the studied model, without introducing a special
class of agents, as has been done in previous works. This dominance occurs even if
the initial numbers of people with extreme opinions is very small. Possible suggestions
related to mitigation of the process are briefly discussed.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, extremism, agent based modeling, bounded confidence model, sociophysics
1. Introduction
Modeling of opinion dynamics is one of the core domains of sociophysics, rising in popularity
since the early 1990’s. The use of an analogy of opinions with spins and exchanges of information
during social contacts with spin-spin interactions has allowed an effective use of the considerable
range of tools developed for magnetic systems. In particular, the early models of opinion forma-
tion focused on the processes leading to consensus—corresponding to a fully magnetized state, e.g.,
[1–8]. Despite significant simplifications, quite a few interesting regularities were discovered, cor-
responding, in a general way, to observed behaviors in social systems. Unfortunately, a quantitative
description of the actual societies and the psycho-social phenomena remains a rather elusive goal.
At the same time, the observation that a complete consensus is quite unusual in the real social
situations has led to creation of models focused on the coexistence of several opinions in the
same society, often in an open conflict. Many of these works were based on the same concep-
tual foundations and technical methods as the “consensus” studies, but have introduced a par-
ticular type of modification, namely the introduction of inflexible agents, designed to lead to a
long lasting state of disagreement. Examples include the bounded confidence approach [9, 10];
the discrete opinion model of Galam [11]; the binary Naming Game approach [12–14]; the voter
model [15, 16]; the Sznajd model [17, 18] and the approaches based on the notion of stubborn-
ness [19, 20]. Despite the differences in many basic properties of these models: the available
opinion space (binary opinions, multiple discrete values or continuous spectrum); the social net-
work (fully connected, geometrical, small-world or scale free network); the specific method of
describing the interactions between agents—all these works point out that the presence of even a
small group of agents with fixed opinions may sway a large part of the community or even the
whole of it. These special agents get labeled in various ways: zealots, inflexibles, independents
or extremists. The diversity of the models is due to different kinds of simplifications of social
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systems they use, focusing on separate aspects of individual char-
acteristics. At the same time, the similarity of themodel outcomes
documents, in author’s opinion, the robustness and importance
of the result of sociophysical modeling, especially in the context
of group behavior and its driving mechanisms. The universality
of the relationship between presence of inflexible extremists and
evolution of opinions deserves much broader recognition and
interdisciplinary approach.
One of the reasons for the difficulties in constructing socio-
physical models of opinion change quantitatively describing
some actual societies, is the fact that the changes of individual
views on many issues depend not only on the current opin-
ion state of the person and the perceived opinions of others (as
assumed in most models), but also on the person’s own emo-
tions and the emotions of others (see for example, [21–27]). The
individual dynamical processes of opinion change may be com-
plex functions of many variables, internal and external, much
more difficult to describe than the spin-spin interactions. The
interpersonal contacts involve not only transmission of informa-
tion and argumentation, but also mutual influences changing the
emotional states. The same applies to the ways in which media
or propaganda influence opinions. Social studies recognize the
significant role of emotions in the increasing polarization of opin-
ions, observed in many social systems, from politics to scientific
issues [28–35], and the recent sociophysical studies begin to cover
this aspect of the process. Based on these ideas, a model that com-
bines opinions and emotions has already been proposed by the
author. It is based on a discrete version of the cusp catastrophe
description of an individual opinion change resulting from a pair-
wise communication process. The model has been coupled with
a realistic social communication network, and has been used suc-
cessfully to quantitatively describe the behavior of the users of a
political discussion forum [36–38]. One of the results of this work
was that even without the introduction of a special class of inflex-
ibles, the emotions due to a conflict of opinions may “harden”
the behavior of individuals and groups, leading to a stable, con-
flicted social state. Themodel presented in the current paper has a
much simpler background. Using the well known bounded con-
fidence framework, in which opinions may take any value from
a continuous spectrum, we introduce a correlation between the
extreme opinions and low flexibility, mediated via a persons emo-
tion. The model does not aim at a quantitative description of any
social environment. Its goal is to show that the shift to extreme
and intolerant views in many social situations may be modeled
without resorting to a special class of agents.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Bounded Confidence and Relative
Agreement Opinion Change Models
The bounded confidence approach forms a special class of opin-
ion change models, characterized by continuous distribution of
possible opinions within a given range and a simple, intuitive
mechanism for individual opinion changes. The original formu-
lation proposed by Deffuant et al. [4] stems from the following
observations: to be mutually influenced, the two communicating
agents must have initially opinions that are close enough. If the
difference of opinions is too big, the communication process is
impossible, and there is no change in the respective opinions as
the effect of the interaction. On the other hand, the model postu-
lates that if the initial opinions are close enough, the interaction
between the agents brings them even closer. If we denote indi-
vidual opinion of agent i at given time t as oi(t), and consider
the outcome of the interaction between agents i and j, then the
opinions at time t + 1 are governed by the following equations:
oi(t + 1) = oi(t)+ µ(oj(t)− oi(t)), (1)
oj(t + 1) = oj(t)+ µ(oi(t)− oj(t)), (2)
if |oi(t)−oj(t)| ≤ d. Otherwise oi(t + 1)= oi(t) and oj(t + 1)=
oj(t). The value of d, called tolerance threshold, was initially con-
sidered to be the same for all agents in the system. The constant
µ is assumed to lie between 0 and 0.5, and determines the speed
of convergence of the opinions.
The basic model described above leads to an aggregation of the
opinions into a few narrowly defined bands, distributed approxi-
mately regularly in the available opinion domain. The number of
these final opinions depends on the relationship between the tol-
erance threshold d and the width of the available opinion space
D, and may be approximated by D/2d.
The Deffuant model is one of the most studied in socio-
physics. It has been used in various communication topologies,
starting from fully connected network, where any agent may
communicate with any other; grid models with limited range
of interactions and complex social networks [39]. Sousa [40]
has studied the bounded confidence model on a growing scale
free network, in which the new agents adjust their opinions to
the ones who have already communicated (and who may have
attuned their opinions previously). Other modifications include
substituting the step-like form of the effects of the tolerance by
some continuous function [41]. An important modification is
the “relative agreement model” [42], in which the agents are
characterized by individual opinions and uncertainties, which
both may evolve as the outcome of the communication between
agents. Another interesting modification is the introduction of
the effects of rejection, if the two agents’ opinions differ too
much [43].
Most of these works have assumed an initially random dis-
tribution of opinions and other agent characteristics, which may
not be a realistic approach and in some cases lead to theoretically
interesting, but non-applicable results. For this reason, Carro
et al. [44] devoted part of their study to the role played by nonuni-
form initial conditions, a topic that we shall also examine in
this work. In general, the Deffuant model, despite its conceptual
simplicity, provides a fertile ground for creative extensions and
model variants (recent interesting works include [45–47]).
An important example of such modification was the introduc-
tion of a small number of agents with extreme views and very
small tolerances, and study of how such admixture may influ-
ence the behavior of the majority [41, 42]. These works have
shown that even a small number of the inflexible agents may
shift the opinions of the large part of the community toward the
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extreme values. The justification for the introduction of the spe-
cial class of the extremists, given in [41] was “often people who
have extreme opinions tend to be more convinced. On the contrary,
people who havemoderate initial opinion express the lack of knowl-
edge (and uncertainty).” Our present effort is to use—within the
same philosophy—a basic connection between emotions associ-
ated with extreme views and accompanying low tolerances, and
to show that a corresponding modification of the model can lead
to a qualitative explanation of the polarization phenomena and
shifts to extreme opinions found in many social situations, with-
out introducing any special class of agents, allowing that anyone
may become an extremist.
2.2. Deffuant Model with Emotions
In our work we consider a variation of the Deffuant, Amblard and
Weisbuch model, where extreme opinions are connected with
high emotions and low tolerances. Thus, changing the opinion of
any agent changes its emotions and tolerance as well. For exam-
ple, if the available spectrum of opinions is given by the interval
between 0 and 1, we assume that opinions close to 1 (defined
as the extreme view) are associated with strong emotions while
those with values close to 0 (moderates) have low levels of emo-
tions. Such choice of the opinion space is natural for the case of
the emergence of extreme opinions with respect to some issues,
for example in the case the moderates do not consider the issue
important and do not have a fixed opinion, while others think
the issue is very important, have a definite opinion and approach
it with high levels of emotions (the extremists). This follows
directly from the justification quoted above. It is very interest-
ing that the psychological research [48] confirms that people with
extreme political views are more resistant to externally generated
anchors, supporting the hypothesis that the extremists have very
high confidence in their opinions.
The basic equations governing the bounded confidence
opinion dynamics which we shall use follow the modifications
introduced many years ago by Weisbuch et al. [49], who sub-
stituted the single single universal d in Equations (1) and (2) by
individual tolerances of the agents di:
oi(t + 1) = oi(t)+ µ(oj(t)− oi(t)), (3)
if |oi(t)− oj(t)| < di
oj(t + 1) = oj(t)+ µ(oi(t)− oj(t)). (4)
if |oi(t)− oj(t)| < dj
As before, there is no change of opinion of the agent i if the dif-
ference of the opinions of the two agents exceeds the tolerance di.
We propose that for an agent with opinion oi, the emotional
involvement of the agent would be proportional to oi and due to
this increasing involvement, the tolerance threshold of that agent
would be some decreasing function of the individual opinion
di = F(oi).
These considerations may be generalized simply into the cases
of two opposing opinions, located at the extreme ends of the
opinion space (for example taking the−1 and+1 values). In such
case, the individual tolerance threshold can be written as decreas-
ing function of the absolute value of the opinion, di = F(|oi|). In
such case, we would call agents with opinion close to 0 the “mod-
erates,” while the name “extremists” would apply to agents with
opinions close to 1 or to−1.
We chose a very simple relationship between the opinion and
the tolerance of an agent, namely
di = dmax − |oi|
L(dmax − dmin), (5)
where dmax is the tolerance for the moderates and dmin is the
tolerance for the agents with the extreme opinions; while L is
the exponent determining the rate of decrease of the tolerance
with increasing opinion value. In this work we assume dmin
to be very small (0.0001) while dmax is one of the parame-
ters of the simulations. We shall study the system behavior for
L = 1, 2, and 3. The larger values of L correspond to a slower
decrease of di with the increasing value of the opinion oi, and a
more tolerant behavior of the agents with intermediate opinions
(Figure 1).
Due to the assumed form of dependence of di on oi, the out-
come of the communication between two agents becomes an
asymmetric function of the agents’ opinions. Suppose that oi > oj
so that di < dj. It is possible to encounter a situation when agent
j would find agent i within its radius of tolerance and therefore
adjust its opinion, while agent i would perceive j to be beyond
its tolerance threshold and remain unchanged. As the result of
the asymmetry, the moderates are more likely to change their
opinions to more extreme values, while the extremists have less
chances to moderate their views. The evolution of the system is
driven largely by this asymmetry.
FIGURE 1 | Graphical example of the postulated form of the
dependence of the tolerance di on the current opinion oi , for L = 1,2,3
and dmax = 0.23 and dmin = 0.0001.
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3. Results
3.1. Results for Uniform Distribution of Initial
Opinions
We shall start our discussion of the results with the simula-
tions using a uniform, random distribution of the initial opinions
within the [0 : 1] domain. This is a typical assumption used in
many opinion dynamicsmodels, which provides particularly easy
implementation. In our simulations we have used a “society” of
NA = 20, 000 agents, communicating in a simple, fully con-
nected, any-to-any topology, in a random sequence. The time is
measured in steps, each of which corresponds to NA single com-
munication events, that is one event per agent. We note here that
on the average there would be two communications per agent
in each step (one “initiated” by the agent, and one in which it
is a “target”). Each presented simulation covers a total time of
500 steps, which is, for most of situations, enough to reach stable
final configuration. The random differences in the initial opin-
ion distribution and in history of communication between single
simulation runs lead to slightly different final distributions. For
this reason, we have run the simulations for the same parame-
ter values 200 times, and the figures show averaged aggregates of
such repeated simulations.
The simulation results are presented in Figures 2–4, for L =
1, 2, and 3, respectively. For small values of the moderate agents’
tolerance threshold dmax, in all three cases the system very quickly
evolves into a stable state. This state is characterized by the pres-
ence of a few discrete opinion values, around which the final
agent opinions cluster. Such behavior is the hallmark of the
Deffuant model. The difference from the original simulations is
that the separation between these peaks in the final opinion dis-
tribution gets smaller with increasing opinions. This is simply
due to the decrease of the local tolerances. In the of L = 1 and
L = 2 (Figures 2A, 3A), for small enough dmax the peak structure
becomes washed out around oi ≈ 1.
When the value of dmax is increased, the final pattern of opin-
ion distribution peaks shifts progressively to larger values of
opinions (Figures 2A,B, 3A,B 4A,B). This is exactly what one
would expect from the results of the original bounded confidence
models.
What is perhaps more interesting is the appearance, for large
enough values of dmax, at the early stages of the system evolution
(t < 200), of a “traveling maximum” in the opinion distribu-
tion, shifting to higher values of opinions as the time progresses.
For L = 1 this transition state appears at quite large value of
dmax ≈ 0.45, while for for L = 2 and 3 it occurs at much smaller
values (around dmax ≈ 0.35). The traveling peak gathers most
of the moderate agents in a single group with similar opinions,
which shift toward more extreme values, eventually leading to a
single state, in which the whole society is unified in the extreme
opinion (Figures 2D, 3D, 4D).
The rapidness of the transition between the “classical” state of
several opinion peaks and the state with a single extremist con-
sensus, as a function of changing dmax depends on the exponent
L. For L = 1 the transition is gradual, while for L = 2 and
L = 3 it is very steep. We note here that while the results for
L = 1 (with linear dependence of the tolerance threshold) are
quite different from those obtained for L = 2 and L = 3, the latter
FIGURE 2 | Cumulative distribution of opinion evolution gathered
from 200 simulation runs at various values of the maximum
tolerance dmax for the linear form of the Equation (5), i.e., L = 1.
For small enough values of dmax (A) the results resemble the traditional
deffuant model, with locally rescaled distances between opinion maxima.
Increasing dmax shifts the position of the peaks and causes some
rearrangement at the high end of the opinion spectrum (B,C). Above
certain value of the tolerance of the open-minded agents (D) we
observe fast transition to a single, extremist opinion. Note the
differences in the vertical scales in the figure panels. The small
oscillations visible especially in the early evolution in (C,D) are artifacts
of the visualization.
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FIGURE 3 | Cumulative distribution of opinion evolution gathered
from 200 simulation runs at various values of the maximum
tolerance dmax for the quadratic form of the Equation (5), i.e.,
L = 2. As in the linear case, for small values of dmax we observe stable
maxima of opinions with decreasing separation as opinion increases (A).
However, in the quadratic dependence of tolerance on opinion, the
transition to a single, extremist opinion happens for much smaller values
of dmax and the dependence of the system behavior on dmax is much
more rapid [cf. the transition from a two-peak form (B) for dmax = 0.30,
via an intermediate state (C) to a single maximum (D) at dmax = 0.36].
FIGURE 4 | Evolution of opinion distributions for various values of the maximum tolerance dmax for L = 3. The results are very similar to the case of L = 2.
Panels (A–D) correspond to dmax values of 0.20, 0.30, 0.34 and 0.36, respectively.
two lead to a very similar behavior, which can be seen comparing
Figures 3, 4.
We note here that using values of L smaller than 1 leads to
a “less interesting” behavior: even for quite large values of dmax
the system remains in a state similar to the one depicted in
Figures 2A,B i.e., a series of peaks in the density of final states
corresponding to groups with separated opinion, no longer capa-
ble to interact between each other. This is due to much faster
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drop of the agents’ tolerance with the increasing value of their
opinion.
The origin of the above results may be described in plain lan-
guage. For small enough dmax, the initial process of grouping of
opinions quickly leads to a situation, where the local maxima in
opinion distribution become separated by distances greater than
the local tolerances, leading to a stable multi-peak structure. On
the other hand, for large values of dmax, the local tolerances are
greater than the separation between the peaks, which allows agent
transfer between the groups. Such transfer is, as we have noted,
asymmetric: the moderate agents are more likely to become con-
vinced by the more extremist ones, and are unable to “defend”
their views.
3.2. Effects of Decreased Tolerance due to
Contact with Different Opinions
Another psychologically based modification of the bounded con-
fidence model is the consideration of the emotional effects of
communication with people whose opinions differ by more than
the tolerance threshold. Examples of such modifications include
the repulsion effects such as the ones studied by Huet, Deffuant
and Jager [50] or partial antagonism considered by Kurmyshev
et al. [51].
In our case, the main dynamic equations governing the opin-
ion evolution remain unchanged. However, we postulate that the
tolerance of any agent who met someone whose opinion was
beyond the tolerance threshold may be temporarily decreased.
This is due to the immediate negative emotional reaction caused
by confronting “intolerable” views. The effective individual toler-
ance threshold shall be defined as follows: d¯i(t)=mi(t)·di(t), with
mi(t)≤ 1. The factormi(t) may be called the “mood” of the agent
i. If the latest interaction of the agent i was with an agent within
the tolerance limits, then the mood is “good” and mi(t) = 1. On
the other hand, if the latest interaction was with an agent whose
opinion was beyond the tolerance threshold, the mood becomes
“bad,” and the mood factor becomes mi(t) = m < 1. In the cur-
rent work we have used m = 0.5. The mood is applied only once
per turn to any agent, so there are no cumulative effects.
The substitution of the effective tolerance d¯i(t) in place of
di(t) leads to significant changes of the behavior of the system
(Figures 5, 6). The trend toward extremist consensus appears at
lower values of dmax. Moreover, the “traveling peak” becomes vis-
ible even when there are still well defined “classical” maxima in
the opinion distribution function. In general, the introduction
of the mood factor broadens the range of conditions under which
the system evolves into the uniform extremist state.
The explanation for this phenomenon is the increase of the
asymmetry between moderates and extremists caused by the
presence of the mood factor. If we consider, as before, the pair
of agents i and j, with oi > oj then if di is small enough that agent
i fails to tolerate agent j, its effective tolerance d¯i would dimin-
ish further. At the same time, the more tolerant moderate agent j
would not decrease its effective tolerance d¯j. As the result, the less
tolerant agents are, in general, becoming even less tolerant, and
less likely to adjust their opinions.
When the mood is taken into account, the system evolution
becomes more complex, especially within the transition range of
dmax (Figures 5B,C, 6B,C). The key observation, that for large
enough values of the initial tolerance of the moderates the system
eventually reaches the extremist consensus, remains unchanged.
Including the mood modification leads, however, to a significant
lowering of the value of dmax at which such transition occurs.
3.3. Effects of Nonuniform Initial Conditions
As we have noted, most simulations of opinion dynamics start
with the uniform random distribution of the agents’ character-
istics. This corresponds to high temperature limit in statistical
physics, but may be quite inappropriate to the study of real social
systems, where uniform randomness is quite unusual. The results
shown in the previous sections were obtained with such start-
ing conditions. In this section we shall consider the effects of a
nonuniform distribution of the initial opinions.
From the point of view of the social sciences one of the most
interesting initial distributions is the one in which the number
of the people with the extreme opinions is initially rather small.
This corresponds to the question: would such small admixture of
extreme opinions lead to eventual adoption of these views by the
majority, and if yes, under which conditions?
To check this possibility, we have simulated the behavior of
our system starting from an exponential initial distribution of
opinions, described by p(oi) ∼ exp(−aoi), with a = 5. Relatively
large value of a ensures that initially the majority of agents have
opinions close to zero [the initial ration of the number of agents
with opinions close to 1 (extreme views) and those with opinion
close to 0 (moderates) is less than 0.0067].
Figure 7 shows the averages of evolving distributions of opin-
ions with the exponential initial conditions and with other sim-
ulation parameters corresponding to the system in shown in
Figure 3. There is no modification due to mood factor (i.e.,
m = 1) and L = 2.
For low values of dmax (Figures 7A,B) the familiar pattern of
multiple, separated peaks is seen, with very small contribution
of the agents with large values of opinions. When dmax becomes
greater than a certain threshold, we observe that a single trav-
eling peak forms in the distribution, which moves to ever higher
values of opinion as time passes (Figures 7D–F). Especially inter-
esting is the situation for dmax ≈ 0.41 (Figure 7D), where the
final situation includes two separate groups: one, for which the
opinion remains stable and relatively moderate and the second,
which gradually shifts to more and more extreme views. Above
dmax = 0.42 this second group “gathers” the majority of the
agents. This shows that if the tolerance of the moderate agents
is large enough, even a very small fraction of extreme opinions
can cause the whole society to gradually shift their views to the
extreme position.
3.4. Competition between Two Opinions
The results presented so far were for a simple
moderate↔extremist opinion range [0:1], that is for the
case when the “competition” is between no opinion and a
definite opinion. However, our model may be easily extended
to a conflicted, binary opinion case. Then, depending on the
initial conditions, we could also have the eventual dominance of
the extreme views, but this time located at both extreme ends
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FIGURE 5 | Evolution of opinion distribution for various values of the maximum tolerance dmax for the linear form of the Equation (5), i.e., L = 1, for the
mood factor m = 0.5. Panels (A–D) correspond to dmax values of 0.15, 0.25, 0.35 and 0.45, respectively.
FIGURE 6 | Evolution of opinion distribution for various values of the maximum tolerance dmax for the quadratic form of the Equation (5), i.e., L = 2
and the mood factor m = 0.5. Panels (A–D) correspond to dmax values of 0.20, 0.23, 0.25 and 0.27, respectively.
of the spectrum [−1:+1]. Such an evolution, squeezing out
the moderates and effectively inhibiting any communication
between the conflicted camps not only corresponds to many
actual social systems, but also could provide an alternative
introduction to the discrete models of opinion change, resulting
from the continuous one, such as the Deffuant model.
Figure 8 presents an example of the system behavior close to
the transition point for starting conditions that favor moderate
opinions: the initial distribution is a symmetrical, exponentially
vanishing one (corresponding to the one used in the previ-
ous section). The averaged distribution of evolving opinions
shows quite rapid transition from the central moderate opinion
to two separate populations as the value of dmax is increased.
Above a certain value of the moderates’ tolerance, despite their
initial dominant position, the system quickly evolves into a dual-
extremist society, with the two groups being separated beyond
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FIGURE 7 | Opinion evolution for various values of the maximum
tolerance dmax for the exponential distribution of the initial
opinions. Quadratic form of the Equation (5), i.e., L = 2 is used; there is
no mood modification. Despite initially dominant position of the moderate
agents, above dmax = 0.42 the system evolves toward the extreme
consensus. The evolution is, however, much slower than in the case of
the uniform initial opinion distribution. Still, even a small number of zealots
can convince the whole society eventually to their views. Panels (A–F)
correspond to dmax values of 0.15, 0.25, 0.40, 0.41, 0.42 and 0.45,
respectively.
their respective tolerances, effectively unable to communicate.
Because the initial distribution of opinions was symmetrical, the
evolution averaged over multiple simulation runs is also symmet-
rical. We remind, however, that due to the randomness present
in the simulation process, the results for single runs may not
be symmetrical, sometimes with significant differences between
the numbers of supporters of positive and negative opinions and
even an occasional dominance of one group over the other. If
one assumes an asymmetrical initial distribution of opinions, or
a presence of some sort of a bias favoring the positive or neg-
ative opinions (e.g., due to propaganda), the model may lead
to a stable polarized society, with an adjustable average ratio of
majority/minority community sizes.
4. Discussion
The proposed modification of the continuous bounded confi-
dence models does not change the agent-to-agent dynamics, but
examines simply the results of the correlations of opinions and
tolerances, linking the extreme opinions with high emotional
involvement and low tolerances. As such, it may be considered
a relatively minor change—yet the results seem to be quite
profound.
The basic outcome of our model may be simply summarized
as follows: in situation when extreme opinions are associated with
high emotions and small tolerance, the more tolerant are the ini-
tial non-extremists, the more extreme becomes the final society.
This result is obtained without the adjustment of the core dynam-
ics of the opinions (Equations 3 and 4). For the tested values of
small (1000 agents) and medium size (20,000) communities we
observed no difference (other than a larger “noise” between the
individual simulation runs for small system sizes) in the result-
ing distributions. There was only a small change of the time scale
of reaching the final configurations. It is possible that for very
large communities (1M or more), the fact that only a small “sam-
pling rate” of all possible connections (with the time tick defined
as communication events equal to the number of agents and the
number of connections proportional to the square of the number
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FIGURE 8 | Case of two competing opinions, with opinion scale from
−1 to +1. A symmetric, exponentially decaying distribution of the initial
opinions is used. As in Figure 2, L = 2 is used, there is no mood
modification. Results are shown for values of dmax at which the transition
from a single moderate majority peak to two separate, opposite opinion
groups occurs. Note much larger values of the tolerance dmax , for which the
transition from moderate final state to extremism occurs, than in the previous
simulations. However, this should be compared to the fact that available
opinion space is twice as large. Panels (A–F) correspond to dmax values of
0.56, 0.58, 0.60, 0.62, 0.64 and 0.66, respectively.
of the agents) is actually used in the process may lead to a more
diverse simulation results. Perhaps one should then scale the time
ticks in quadratic relation to the number of the agents. On the
other hand, in our opinion, the any-to-any topology is in any case
a model one, oversimplifying the real social systems. Our modest
goal was to show an indicative behavior. The future work should
focus on the effects due to more realistic social network topolo-
gies, including dynamic networks (in which a possible reaction to
meeting an agent outside the tolerance limit results in cutting the
communications). In such networks the average number of links
per agent does not grow linearly with the number of agents, but
may remain fixed.
The decreasing tolerance associated with extreme opinions,
leads to a disappearance of the moderate agents who are tolerant
enough to “listen” to the extremists. This observation extends the
statement by Weisbuch et al [49], that “in the long run the behav-
ior depends on “open-minded” (high threshold) agents, in the short
run on the low threshold ones.” If open-mindedness is correlated
with one opinion and low tolerance with the other, themodel pre-
dicts that the closed-minded part of the community would gain
the upper hand. The casual observation of many social phenom-
ena in recent years indicates that such reasoning might be close
to reality.
The model of extremism propagation created by Deffuant,
Amblard and Weisbuch [41, 42] has shown that a small fraction
of artificially introduced inflexible fanatics (agents with very low
tolerances) can, indeed, influence a much larger society. The two
approaches share the same pessimistic final conclusion: not only
the final state is dominated by the extreme opinions, but also
their tolerances are very small (Figures 7, 8 of reference [42]).
This offers little hope for a possible reversal of the situation,
by propaganda or by the introduction of “counter-extremist”
agents—because after reaching the extreme opinion, the majority
of the agents becomes close-minded. One of the ways the opin-
ion/tolerance correlation, used in our work, may form is through
emotions, especially the negative ones: fear, hatred, anger, rejec-
tion. . . The analysis of the political discussion fora confirms this
reasoning [38, 52, 53]. Even in the situations where proponents
of the opposing opinions actively seek out contact with each
other, the chances of influencing the opinion of the opponents
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are practically zero. Moreover, if we look at the actual tactics of
many extremist movements (in politics and in other domains),
we note the conscious and quite effective use of he negative emo-
tions in the group consolidation and establishing orthodoxy. The
proposed model offers some suggestions on combating the shift
toward the extreme opinions. The obvious method for the initial
stages (when the majority of the population is still moderate) is
to decrease the tolerance of the majority. This can be done via
propaganda that builds up the negative emotions regardless of
the opinions held (effectively decreasing dmax). It can be done,
for example, by media which would portray the situation as dan-
gerous; by instilling fear of change or invoking special orthodoxy
status to certain (moderate) opinions. Such tactics may be recog-
nized in many social situations. The system would then remain
in the state with significant presence of the moderates, but there
is an associated social cost to such tactics. While the opinions of
the agents would remain moderate, their tolerances would be low
and the social communication would be weak. This cost must be
weighted against the possible danger of harboring and encourag-
ing the shift to extreme opinions (and the associated social and
political decisions).
A much more difficult task is reversing the transition to the
extremist consensus in the latter stages of the system evolution.
Here, the only hope is in a combination of increase of the tol-
erance of the extremists (increasing dmin) and in the presence
of inflexible moderate agents or appropriate propaganda leading
away from the extreme opinions. Attempts to change opinions
without increasing the tolerances of the extremists, for example
by calm and rational arguments—tactics often tried in the real
world—are bound to fail. Perhaps one of the ways of increasing
the tolerances by promoting the sense of security, calm, even by
assuring the positive feeling of achievement in the members of
the newly formed majority, opening the way for opinion change.
Otherwise, the final state is not only extremist, but also effectively
frozen in that state. It is not surprising, that the leaders of the
extremist groups, after they achieve a relative dominance, con-
tinue the efforts of keeping the tolerance of their supporters very
low, for example by stressing the presence of “enemies” and the
dangers of “heresy.”
A recent analysis of many social systems by Ramos et al. [19]
has shown an universal, nonlinear behavior of the fraction of peo-
ple holding extreme views on many issues when compared to
the overall support (both moderate and extreme) for the issue in
question. This nonlinearity has been observed in many domains,
including religious views, political interests, economic situation
evaluation, book and movie reviews. In most cases, for low val-
ues of the overall support of a given opinion (denoted in Ramos
et al. [19] by f ), the fraction of extremists (denoted by fe) is much
smaller. On the other hand, when f becomes close to 1, fe becomes
comparable to f , i.e., most supporters adopt extreme position.
These findings were accompanied by a dynamical model of
individual opinion changes, in which the averaged opinion of
neighbors was modified via a parameter describing an individual
stubbornness. The model proposed by Ramos et al. has shown a
similar kind of nonlinearity between f and fe.
Despite the simplicity of the modified Deffuant model pre-
sented in this paper, it produces results that are qualitatively
similar to those of Ramos et al. Figures 2–7 show that for low
enough dmax, the final ratio of the number of extremist views fe
(defined by opinions greater than, for example, 0.7) to the total
number of supporters f (defined by opinions greater than 0.3) is
less than 1. On the other hand, for large enough values of dmax,
most or all agents supporting an issue have extreme views and
fe/f ≈ 1. An example of the time evolution of these numbers is
FIGURE 9 | Time dependence of the ratio of agents with opinions
greater than 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7, respectively, in the case of L = 2 and
exponential initial conditions. If one defines the general support for the
issue as having an opinion greater than 0.3 and the extreme views as those
greater than 0.7, then the ratio between the two varies nonlinearly with time
starting from values much smaller than 1 and approaching 1 after longer
periods of time. The absolute values of the support depend on the initial
tolerance of the moderates dmax .
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shown in Figure 9, which compares the fractions of agents with
opinions greater than 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, for dmax values just below
and just above the transition to the extremist consensus (corre-
sponding to Figures 7C,E). Depending on the value of dmax the
ratio fe/f evolves in a nonlinear fashion in time, qualitatively cor-
responding to the analyses of actual opinions provided by Ramos
et al. [19].
5. Conclusions
The persistence and increasing strength of extremist views poses
a grave threat to democratic societies. Recent years have shown
many examples of rather quick transition from moderate soci-
eties to ones dominated by intolerance, zealotry and prejudices.
Understanding themechanisms leading to such changes is, there-
fore, quite important.
This paper claims no special, unique or directly applicable
explanation of the real world phenomena. It belongs, in our
opinion, to a broad and diverse group of models that focus on
the general conditions leading to extremism formation. Despite
the significant differences between these models—for example
present in descriptions of the individual behaviors and of the
social interactions—they have indicated that even a small group
of inflexible proponents of extremist views often leads to the
eventual dominance of the extremism.
In this work, as in our earlier discrete approaches [36, 37], we
have connected the degree of tolerance and capacity for chang-
ing one’s own opinion with the emotional state, recognizing
(in a rough way) the complexity of human psychology. In our
approach anyone can become an extremist, anyone can become
an inflexible zealot, so there is no need to introduce a special class
of agents. The suggestion coming from the current model is that
to fight extremism it is not sufficient to present counterarguments
(which would not appeal to the narrow-minded extremists), but
to strive to lower the emotional commitment and therefore to
promote open-mindedness, as necessary condition for any social
discussion. Conversely, in the presence of the small minority
groups threatening the moderate majority, the best defensive
tactics is to lower the tolerance of the moderates—for exam-
ple by emotional appeals. In a recent paper [54], Sznajd-Weron,
Szwabinski and Weron have analyzed, in similar spirit of basic
models, the differences between the opinion changes due to per-
sonal and situational influence. In the first case, the dominant role
is played by fixed personal traits (for example a certain fraction of
agents are inflexibles, while others change their opinions easily).
In the situational model, all agents share the same probability of
opinion change. The parameters of the two models can be chosen
in such a way that the frequency of opinion changes is the same—
but it turns out that the results of the two approaches in certain
conditions are very different, and the approach based on fixed
personal traits may lead to less realistic simulation results. In the
light of this analysis, our approach, which correlates certain char-
acteristics of the agents, without assigning special status to any
of them, may be described as situational. At the same time, the
final configurations resulting from the simulations may include
agents with individually distinct behavior (flexible or inflexible).
The induced agent characteristics of low tolerance in a certain
social issue may “spill over” to other issues, where it would be
seen as a personal trait. In this aspect, the task of distinguishing
the two types of behavior becomes even more difficult to model.
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